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Loyalty programs (LPs) are widely used by firms but not well understood. These programs
provide discounts and perks to loyal customers and are costly to administer, but produce uncer-
tain changes in spending patterns. We use a large and detailed dataset on customer shopping
behavior at one of the largest U.S. retailers before and after joining a loyalty program to eval-
uate how behavior changes. We combine this with detailed spatial data on customer and store
locations, including the locations of competing firms. We find significant changes in behavior
associated with joining the LP with a large amount of heterogeneity across customers. We
find that location relative to competitors is the factor most strongly associated with increases
in spending following joining the LP, suggesting that the LP’s quantity discounts work pri-
marily through business stealing and not through other demand expansion. We next estimate
a model of what variables determine how spending will change after joining the LP. We use
high-dimensional data on spatial relationships between customers, the focal firm’s stores, and
competing stores as well as customers’ historical spending patterns. This model is used to test
whether past sales data reflecting customer’s vertical value to the firm or spatial data reflect-
ing customer’s horizontal vulnerability are more important determinants of post-LP spending
increases. We show how LASSO regularization estimated on complex spatial relationships are
more effective than are models using past sales data or simpler spatial models. Finally, we
show how firms can use customer and competitor location data to substantially increase LP
performance through spatially driven segmentation.





Loyalty programs (LPs) are now prevalent in many industries. The loyalty programs as marketers
know them today originated in the airlines in the 1980s and have since permeated industries such
as hotels, casinos, retailers, grocery stores, and restaurants, among others. The pervasiveness of
loyalty programs is partly due to their flexibility in how they can be structured (e.g., earning rates
and rewards) and managed for strategic decisions (e.g., targeting to increase customer engagement).
In spite of the popularity of loyalty programs with firms, their effectiveness at increasing profits
has long been subject to debate. This debate has centered on the costs of giving discounts and perks
to the most loyal customers, as well as the costs of administering the program itself, and whether
these costs are justified by increases in spending by those customers. Loyalty programs have the
potential to increase profits by increasing switching costs for existing customers, stealing business
from rivals, or through second degree price discrimination. They may also indirectly increase profits
by increasing customers psychological perceptions of the firm, by generating customer data that can
be used for targeted promotions or CRM, or by exploiting agency issues such as flights booked by
business travelers and paid for by their employers (Dreze and Nunes (2008), Roehm et al. (2002),
Verhoef (2003), and Shugan (2005)).1
Empirical studies of whether loyalty programs actually do increase profits have found mixed
results. Verhoef (2003) finds that the effects are positive but very small, DeWulf et al. (2001)
finds no support for positive effects of direct mail, Shugan (2005) finds that firms gain short term
revenue at the expense of longer term reward payments, and Hartmann and Viard (2008) found
no evidence that loyalty programs create switching costs. Gopalakrishnan et al. (2021) find that
loyalty programs can increase profits by reducing customer attrition away from the focal firm.
In this paper, we use a large and detailed dataset from one of the largest U.S. retailers on
customer shopping behavior before and after joining a loyalty program. This loyalty program takes
a common form, tiered discounts after a certain level of spending, essentially operating as 2nd
degree price discrimination or one particular form of behavior-based pricing (BBP). We therefore
analyze the program through the lens of theoretical work in marketing on price discrimination
and BBP, most notably Shin and Sudhir (2010). We leverage our data and this framework to
answer these research questions: when loyalty programs take this common form, how do consumer
1For a more complete review, please see Bijmolt et al. (2011), Liu and Yang (2009), and McCall and Voorhees
(2010)
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spending patterns change after they join? Given large heterogeneity in profitability across LP
joiners, what factors cause a customer to be a profitable LP member? Finally, how can firms use
readily available spatial data on competitive structure to improve LP outcomes? More broadly, we
show how studying these factors contributes to the understanding of loyalty programs and price
discrimination.
The practice of BBP in the form of rewarding one’s best customers with discounted prices is
controversial. Shin and Sudhir (2010) showed how two conditions must be met for this type of
pricing strategy to be profitable. First, there must exist substantial heterogeneity in customer
value. Second, customer preferences must be stochastic. To investigate these conditions empirically
in our retail spending data, we combine detailed customer location data with their data on past
spending patterns. We also collect data on the retailer’s competitor’s locations. A crucial aspect
of our data is that it results from merging credit card spending data with customer data. We
therefore observe spending both before and after a customer joins the LP. We can then exploit
variation across markets with different levels of competition and types of competitors at a granular
level and observe how changes in spending associated with joining the LP varies at the customer
level for customers facing different local competitive structures. We can observe, for instance, if
customers in more isolated markets change their spending or if they merely start receiving discounts
on their purchases and how this differs in highly competitive markets.
We use these features to provide two contributions. We are the first, to our knowledge, to bring
this insight from the BBP literature to the study of loyalty programs and we show that this frame-
work is helpful in clarifying when and how LPs will be profitable. Specifically, we show empirically
the relative importance of our proxies for customer vertical value and stochastic preferences, repre-
sented by horizontal vulnerability to competitors. We show both descriptively and in model form
that customer location and specifically the local competitive structure around each customer are
important factors for predicting when the LP is profitable. Second, we show how firms can opera-
tionalize this insight by using spatial factors to form customer segments and use segment-specific
eligibility rules, or otherwise target the LP based on this segmentation. We use a holdout sample of
customer data to demonstrate how in principle this can identify the most profitable customers who
join the LP. In all these results we use a common insight, that an individual’s spatial relationship
with competitor stores is a primary determinant of when spending increases and that the nature of
this relationship, while complex, is typically exploitable with freely available data. To our knowl-
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edge, this is one of the first papers to explicitly link the competitive structure of a market with the
performance of a loyalty program.2
We first take advantage of the unique nature of our data and show a large and comprehensive
set of descriptive results on customer behavior. Our analysis of the location and spending data
finds the following results. First, behavior often changes significantly when a customer joins the
loyalty program. This change may or may not be caused by the LP itself, the causation could run
in the opposite direction for some customers. However, across all customers the aggregate change in
profits associated with customers joining the LP is small or even negative. Second, there is very wide
variation across customers in profitability, even among similar groups of customers. Certain types
of LP joiners seem especially important, in particular we identify segments of customers who seem
to consolidate their purchases at the focal retailer by increasing trip frequency and customers who
maintain the same amount of products purchased but upgrade to higher priced products.3 Notably,
an important predictor of whether a customer’s joining the LP will be associated with higher or
lower profits is whether they are located near a competitor store or live in an isolated market with
only the focal store present. While this result is intuitive it has not been shown previously in a LP
setting and spatial relationships are not currently used by the firm in targeting their marketing.
This motivates the use of spatial data that accounts for the local competitive structure around each
customer as the basis of a segmentation strategy to increase the LP’s effectiveness.
While simple descriptive results suggest spatial competitive structure is an important deter-
minant of LP effectiveness, the full relationship is likely to be highly complex. To capture the
spatial relationship between the customer, focal firm, and competition, we integrate spatial data
into a model of customer behavior in a novel way. To do so we estimate the relationship between
the change in spending (conditional a customer on joining the LP) and a very large number of
variables on the complex spatial relationships with competitors at the individual level then select
the metrics most predictive of the customer behavior of interest. This estimation is essentially a
variable selection problem and is therefore well suited to shrinkage type estimators like LASSO
regularization.
2Another example is Stourm et al. (2017), who study how distances between retail partners within a coalition
loyalty program influence reward spillover activity.
3We emphasize that we do not observe spending at competitor stores, as is typical with firm-level data. We
therefore do not literally observe consolidation and business stealing effects but infer them from how changes in
behavior within customers vary, especially across customers with different spatial characteristics.
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Most prior work on LP’s suffers from only observing spending data on customers in the program.4
There is a clear selection effect of high spending customers into the LP that significantly complicates
all efforts to measure the effect of LP’s on behavior. Even with pre and post-join data there are
still selection effects that would complicate an effort to isolate a purely casual effect. In particular,
even when measuring the change in spending before and after within an individual customer, the
decision to join the LP could coincide with a planned change in spending. We tackle this selection
effect by modeling self-selection explicitly in a first stage model and then using this to correct for
selection bias in a second stage model of spending. This takes the form of a flexible control function
implementation of a Heckman-style selection correction approach. We find that after correcting
for self-selection, our LASSO implementation of spatial variables performs dramatically better at
identifying profitable customers than standard treatments of spatial data.
Next, we compare the performance of models using spatial data and past sales data as inputs.
Following the insights of Shin and Sudhir (2010), we broadly define these data on spending patterns
as capturing vertical quality or the value of a customer in terms of their overall demand, and
define the data on local competitive structures as capturing horizontal quality or how likely it
is to shift a customers spending from a competitor’s store to the focal store. This estimation
serves two purposes. First, it validates the descriptive result that horizontal quality (i.e., spatial
competitive structure) is a stronger predictor of LP effectiveness than vertical quality (i.e., past
spending patterns or other RFM variables).
Second, we show how firms can take advantage of this insight and leverage customer and com-
petitor location data to increase the performance of their LP through spatially driven segmentation
rules. A potential use for this is for firms to develop strict eligibility rules or use targeting strategies
for LP promotion to avoid promoting the LP to those whose behavior is unlikely to change and
would be using the LP for discounts alone, based on their locations relative to the competition.
Our results show that, consistent with the spirit of recent work in customer valuation (e.g., Ascarza
(2018)), firms should leverage sources of observed heterogeneity and focus on the customers who
are spatially vulnerable with easy access to competitors. While this result seems intuitive, we show
empirically that the firm who provided our data does not currently use spatial information in its
targeting and promotion decisions.
In addition to contributing to the understanding of loyalty programs, we contribute to recent
4See Meyer-Waarden and Benavent (2009) for an exception.
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work that has explored the benefits of geotargeting, where promotion or other marketing activity
is a function of a customer’s real-time location using mobile data (Luo et al. (2014), Chen et al.
(2016)). Fong et al. (2015) and Dube et al. (2017) have also considered “geoconquesting”, where
the marketing activity focuses on instances when the customer is located near a competitor as
opposed to near the focal firm. This literature is limited, but potential gains from geoconquesting
are especially likely when the marketing activity is based in part on business stealing, as it is for
loyalty programs.
While the previous literature therefore incorporates select spatial components, mostly it does
not fully account for the complex customer-store-competitor spatial relationship. In prior work,
competitor information is often integrated into models through simple customer-store or store-
competitor distance metrics, thereby eliminating the possibility of complex spatial analyses. We
find these simple distance metrics perform especially poorly compared to our approach.
This work also adds to the extensive literature related to a customers’ share of wallet, as our
findings suggest that demand changes at the focal firm come at the expense of decreasing sales at
nearby competitors. Prior work has shown that loyalty program membership can increase share
of wallet (Leenheer et al. (2007) and Wirtz et al. (2007)). Chen and Steckel (2012) attempt to
solve the “incomplete information problem” of only observing behavior at a single firm by focusing
on inter-purchase time distributions. Du et al. (2007) recognize that transaction data within the
firm is insufficient on its own and augmentation might be necessary to distinguish customers with
large total market potential. However, prior research does not fully capitalize on the locations of
competitors to better understand potential share of wallet opportunities.
We also contribute to the study of competitive promotions and competitive price discrimination.
Price discrimination strategies such as loyalty rewards should never lower profits by a monopolist
but in oligopoly settings this is no longer true as firms may face a prisoner’s dilemma (Shaffer and
Zhang (1995)). Chen et al. (2001) shows that when individual targeting is possible but imperfect,
it can soften price competition among competing firms, but as targeting precision increases the
prisoner’s dilemma reasserts itself. Ultimately then, it is an empirical question whether and when
targeted price discrimination can increase profits. Previous work has shown that in practice the
benefits of using targeted pricing can be quite high (Rossi et al. (1996), Besanko et al. (2003)). Li
et al. (2018) specifically consider competitive price discrimination across markets and show that
the profitability of tailoring prices to local markets depends on both the local market structure and
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competitive intensity across markets. Our analysis also considers local market structure but with
price discounts in the form of a loyalty program. We show that in the context of quantity discounts,
segmenting customers based on horizontal versus vertical characteristics are differentially profitable
depending on the degree of local competition.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data on retail sales
histories and competitor and customer locations. Section 3 provides model free evidence that the
spatial competitive structure surrounding a customer is the key determinant of LP effectiveness.
Section 4 describes a LASSO estimation of the complex interaction between competitive structure
and LP effectiveness and then uses this result to evaluate the relative predictive power of horizontal
and vertical data and then use this to form a segmentation strategy. Section 5 discusses additional
managerial implications and avenues for future research.
2 Data
In this section we describe the customer transaction data, competitive location data, and provide
an overview of the spatial metrics used to characterize the competitive structure.
2.1 POS Transaction Data
The transaction data comes from a Fortune 500 specialty retailer. The retailer specializes in a
range of product categories including lumber, electrical, and paint, among others. This point-of-
sale (POS) data from the retailer is highly detailed: we observe the full basket of purchases at the
SKU level from a random sample of 10,029 customers between March 2012 and March 2014 across
a variety of product categories, regardless of transaction method (e.g., cash or credit card). These
sum to over 2.4 million SKU level purchases across 897,819 store trips. On average, each customer
has about 90 trips across nearly five different store locations through the two year observation
period, spending about $110 per store visit, $684 per month (at the firm level, potentially across
multiple store locations), and travels about 9.2 kilometers (5.7 miles). The large levels of monthly
and per-trip spending are consistent with the nature of the categories sold at this retailer, which
are relatively high-priced categories. In addition, many of the retailer’s customers are professional




Date range March 2012 to 2014
Mean SD
Trips/customer 90 77
Spend/trip (net, after discounts) $110 $102
Spend/month (net, after discounts) $684 $714
Store locations visited 4.7 3.2
Distance by household (km) 9.2 6.2
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Crucially for this analysis, the firm providing the data uses a variety of methods to associate
transactions with an individual customer (for example, matching addresses across credit cards used
in multiple transactions). This allows the firm to observe all transaction activity regardless of
loyalty program enrollment. Specifically, it allows us to observe changes in customer behavior at
the firm upon joining the LP.6 We also observe all marketing activity for these customers through
the firm’s email campaigns: over 900,000 emails were sent to about 39% of the customers and 11%
of the customers received promotions specifically encouraging enrollment in the loyalty program.
Importantly, the data also contains the customer’s zip code and the latitude/longitude of each
of the firm’s store locations, which provides us with a complete picture of all customer interactions
with the firm across different store locations as well as the specific products purchased at each store
location over time.
We further take advantage of a unique feature of this loyalty program in that the program
discounts are earned and applied on only a single large category of the firm’s goods. We label this
a limited loyalty program to emphasize the distinct structure. As requested by the firm providing
the data, we cannot disclose the category of goods for which the discount applies. Instead, we refer
5This is typical of loyalty programs in many settings, for instance an outsize share of members of airline and hotel
loyalty programs are professionals who travel frequently for work.
6For the average joiner, we observe about 7 months of transaction activity prior to enrollment and about 8.5
months of transactions after joining.
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to it as the focal category of interest.
The structure of the limited loyalty program is that of a second degree price discrimination or
quantity discounts. Customers who reach spending thresholds in the focal category receive discounts
on future purchases within that category. The loyalty program consists of three such thresholds,
with increasing discounts upon reaching each threshold. Customers who reach a given threshold
retain their status until the end of the calendar year, at which point they begin the earning process
again. The loyalty program is offered at the firm level, not the store level, so the thresholds can be
attained from purchases across multiple locations.7
2.2 Competitor Data
We augment the focal firm’s POS transaction data with location information (i.e., latitude and
longitude) from four competitors. We recognize there may be other competitors in a given market
however the firm providing the data explicitly stated these four competitors as their primary concern
and others as inconsequential.8
The four competitors (see Table 2) vary in both size and product breadth. Competitor #1
is a big box store with a wide product variety (BB). The remaining three competitors are small-
box stores. Competitor #2 and competitor #3 offer a wide assortment of products (SB1 and
SB2), whereas competitor #4 specializes in the focal product category for which the limited loyalty
program applies (SS). None of these competitors offered a loyalty program similar in structure to
that of the focal firm throughout the duration of our data.
Competitor Reference Footprint Product Breadth
#1 BB Big-Box Wide
#2 SB1 Small-Box Wide
#3 SB2 Small-Box Wide
#4 SS Small-Box Specialized
Table 2: Competitor Types
7This loyalty program structure is consistent with that of a “customer-tier” LP, as opposed to a “frequency-based”
LP, following Blattberg (2008).
8This industry is highly concentrated, with the focal firm and the primary big-box competitor capturing about
85% of market share, according to a 2019 industry report by IBISWorld.
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The variety in the size and product breadth allows us to compare how the impact of the compet-
itive structure might be competitor or type specific. More importantly, it allows us to gain insight
into the extent of category-level versus store-level business stealing.
The latitude and longitude locations of each competitor are collected from the Google Maps
API. We first pulled all competitors within a 50 kilometer radius of each of the focal stores, and
then pulled all competitors within 50 kilometers of each customer located within a 50 kilometer mile
radius of each focal store.9 This expanded footprint ensures that our definition of the competitive
structure is customer centric rather than limited to the perspective of the focal store.
2.3 Quantifying the Competitive Structure
Our analysis measures and highlights the impact of the complex spatial relationship between the
customer, the focal store, and the competitors on customer behavior and ultimately firm profits.
Quantifying this relationship in such a way to accurately reflect the tradeoffs that an individual
likely encounters when deciding which store to visit requires several complex considerations.
A common approach in quantifying competitive structure is to simply use the distance between a
focal store and the customer along with the distance between the competitor and the focal store (or
more commonly still, an indicator variable if they are both within, say, a 5 kilometer radius of the
focal store). The drawback of this approach is that it does not jointly consider the customer-store-
competitor location, resulting in a potential homogenization of very distinct competitive structures.
This limitation is illustrated in Figure 1: three competitors, C1, C2, and C3, and a customer, I,
are positioned near the focal store S. Both C1 and C2 are nearly the same distance to the store, but
their respective relationships to the customer and the focal store are considerably different. The
customer has to pass by the focal store in order to visit the first competitor, C1, which suggests
some spatial advantage for the focal store. However, the second competitor, C2 is positioned right
next to the customer, acting as a convenient alternative to the focal store. In a different case, C2
and C3 are both equidistant to the customer but one is between the customer and the store and
the other is in the opposite direction. One goal of this analysis is to incorporate these complex
spatial structures into the manager decision process, a strategy that has heretofore been ignored in
the analyses of loyalty program effectiveness.
9We selected 50 kilometers because this was the maximum radius allowed by the Google Maps API at the time







Figure 1: Limitation of Radii Approach
We recognize that it is unreasonable to expect a single metric to capture the complex nature of
the spatial relationship between the customer, focal store, and competitor in its entirety. Instead,
we approach the problem by proposing a large number of metrics, each of which captures at least
some of the complex spatial relationship on its own, and then in our empirical analysis uncover
which metrics or which interactions between metrics best predict customer behavior. By honing in
on the right combination of distance metrics we can determine which specific features of the spatial
relationship influence customer behavior the most.
We therefore consider standard distance metrics between each customer and competitor with
the the focal firm in addition to the following:
• How much closer is the focal store to the customer, relative to the competitor?
• How sparse is the focal store and competitor, relative to the customer?
• Are the focal store and competitor in the same direction from the customer, and to what
extent?
We also allow for interactions between population density and distance metrics to incorporate
the difference in transportation costs between urban and rural areas. For brevity, the complete
description of the distance metrics considered are contained in the appendix.
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3 Spatial Competitive Structure and LP Performance
In this section we take advantage of the unique nature of our data and provide descriptive analysis of
how customer behavior interacts with joining a loyalty program. Because we observe sales patterns
before and after the customer joins the LP we can measure if this behavior changes and if so, how
it changes. These results relate to the extant debates on how and whether LPs are effective at
increasing profits.
We then provide model free evidence that the spatial competitive structure influences LP per-
formance. Our analysis focuses on two metrics of LP effectiveness: the probability that a customer
joins the program, and the change in average monthly spending for customers who decide to join.
Here and throughout the paper, we use the change in spending net of the LP discounts. For cus-
tomers who join the LP but do not change shopping patterns, this change is negative by default
because of the discounts, and all else equal a positive change for this metric can therefore be taken
as strictly beneficial for the retailer. In this section we look at how these metrics relate to the
distance between the customer and the focal store and the four competitor types.
One challenge in analyzing LP effectiveness is that the customer’s decision to join the loyalty
program may be related to unobserved heterogeneity. While we observe purchases both before and
after each customer joins the LP, which allows us to condition on individual-level time-invariant
factors, it is still true that if customers join due to anticipated changes in their level of spending,
the observed change in behavior can not all be attributed to the loyalty program. We therefore do
not treat all changes in spending or other behavior associated with joining the LP as having been
caused by the LP in this section. Instead we provide descriptive results on how behavior changes
and note when those changes in behavior that coincide with joining the LP may be of direct interest
even without a purely causal interpretation.
In addition, we treat the location of each customer as essentially exogenous prior to joining
the LP, in which case the relative difference in outcomes across customers with different spatial
characteristics can provide valid and useful comparisons.
Descriptive Analysis:
Table 3 first presents the monthly sales at the firm level, split into qualified and non-qualified
spend, for all customers and those that enroll in the loyalty program. Standard errors are provided
in parentheses. In terms of overall spending and spending in the LP category, joiners and non-
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joiners are actually quite similar. As expected, customers who join the loyalty on average have
slightly higher monthly spending on products that qualify for the LP discounts but not higher
overall spending, and the differences are modest.
All Customers LP Joiners
Sales per Month $684 ($7) $662 ($35)
Qualified Sales per Month $31 ($1) $47 ($6)
Non-Qualified Sales per Month $652 ($7) $615 ($34)
Table 3: Overall Monthly Spending
We next show the difference between purchase behavior before and after a customer joins the LP.
Table 4 presents the average change in sales, trip frequency, and basket level metrics for customers
who join the loyalty program.10 On average, customers tend to increase monthly spending by
$47 upon joining the loyalty program, with the majority of this change attributed to spend in
categories that qualify for LP discounts. This is not surprising, but we also see a positive change in
non-qualified spend, which could suggesting that the increase in spending associated with joining
the LP spills over into other categories.
In the second column, we limit attention to customers whose change in monthly spend was
positive. Interestingly, for these customers, the vast majority of the increase is attributed to spend
outside of the focal category and does not qualify for the LP discounts. Much of this is driven by a
large increase in trip frequency, with more modest changes in basket diversity (distinct categories
and SKUs), and basket size, relative to all joiners. We do not suggest that the LP alone caused
all of these changes, but note that within the base of customers that do join the loyalty program,
there is substantial heterogeneity in post-join behavior.
Here and throughout, we see substantial heterogeneity across joiners, which suggests that there
may be considerable segmentation opportunities for the firm in order to identify which customers
are most likely to be profitable, as simply joining the LP is clearly no guarantee of increases in
spending.
10For all tables presented in the descriptive analysis, we exclude households that fall within the upper or lower
.5% of monthly sales prior to joining the loyalty program to prevent the undue influence of outliers for the summary
statistics.
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All Joiners > 0 ∆ Sales
∆ Monthly Sales $47 ($76) $821 ($119)
∆ Monthly Qualified Sales $37 ($24) $133 ($43)
∆ Non-Qualified Sales $10 ($67) $688 ($103)
∆ Trip Frequency 0.07 (0.39) 3.95 (0.52)
∆ Unique Categories -0.01 (0.04) 0.14 (0.06)
∆ Unique SKUs -0.30 (0.22) 0.41 (0.29)
∆ # Items -2.44 (2.19) 1.22 (4.25)
Table 4: Change in Behavior
We next consider how a how a rich but often overlooked source of variation across customers, the
competitive structure, can help in attributing the variation in behavior for customers who join the
loyalty program. To start, we first label customers as “isolated” if they are located more than eight
kilometers (five miles) away from any of the focal store’s competitors and “competitive” otherwise,
which indicates there is a competitor relatively close to the customer.11 Table 5 summarizes a few
metrics of interest across these types of customers, namely the probability of joining and the average
changes in monthly qualified and non-qualified spend. We also include the average customer sales
per month to alleviate concerns that our region labels are associated with substantially different
customer types, at least in terms baseline spending patterns.
Approximately one quarter of the customers are located in “competitive” regions and are rela-
tively close to one of the four competitors of interest, as identified by the firm providing the data.
Relative to customers in more isolated regions, these customers have essentially the same probabil-
ity of joining the loyalty program but exhibit a substantially larger change in monthly spend, on
average, with wide heterogeneity in both groups.
As expected, the average change in qualified spending is positive across both groups, on average.
However, customers located near the competition also exhibit an equally high change in average
non-qualified spend, but exhibit greater variation in their changes. For these customers, joining
the loyalty program may present an opportunity to consolidate purchase activity at the focal store.
For customers in relatively isolated areas, they are likely devoting most of their budget to the
11We selected this cutoff based on average distance driven by joining customers to surrounding focal stores.
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focal store prior to joining the LP and enrollment is unlikely to generate additional spend from
competition. The large standard errors within the competitive group suggest that these effects vary
and may depend factors such as which competitors are nearby, or the saturation of competition.
In the “isoloated” group, with no differences across competition, the changes in spending are more
consistent.
Competitive Isolated
Share of Customers 25% 75%
∆ Sales|Join $149 ($128) $87 ($52)
∆ Qualified Sales|Join $57 ($53) $35 ($16)
∆ Non-Qualified Sales|Join $92 ($100) $52 ($45)
Sales per Month $695 ($64) $627 ($41)
Table 5: Effect of Competition
In Table 6 we further split the change in monthly sales based on the median qualified spending
amounts prior to joining the loyalty program. In both cases, the larger average change in spending
comes from below-median spenders pre-LP. This is not too surprising, as these customers may need
to increase spend to qualify for LP discounts. We also see a large difference in the average change
between the isolated and competitive customers within the low spend group. As before, there is
substantial heterogeneity within each of these subgroups, indicating that the drivers of change in
spend are more nuanced than can be captured by our labels.
Competitive Isolated
Pre LP Qualified Spend: Low High Low High
∆ Sales|Join $377 ($252) -$51 ($89) $122 ($81) $55 ($65)
Table 6: Interaction Between Competition and Pre-Join Spending
To analyze what is driving these findings we break down the results by competitor type. Figure 2
shows the average change in monthly spending based on the relative isolation of the customer.12 The
12Note that not all customers may have access to all competitors within a market. Because of this, some customers
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findings are relatively consistent with the aggregate results, with the exception of a notably larger
increase from customers near the big-box generalist, suggesting this type of competitor presents the
most opportunities from which to steal business, and a notably smaller increase from the small-box
specialist, who presents the fewest opportunities from which to steal business.
To better understand this mechanism, recall that the LP only applies to a specific category, not
all products, and that one of the competitors (SS) specializes in selling only that focal category.
We thus note the portion of change in spend that occurs in the LP category of interest. Figure 2
highlights this by distinguishing the change in spend as either qualifying for the LP discount (within
the focal category) or not, where the combined change is noted by a black square. As expected, a
large portion of the change in spend is driven by purchases that qualify for LP discounts. However,
there is substantial positive changes outside of the focal category. If there was no spillover effects of
the loyalty program, we would expect zero change in purchases that will not impact the LP rewards.
Upon joining the LP, customers may decide to consolidate purchase behavior with one store rather
than cherry picking rewards from the focal store (in the qualifying category) and continuing with
the same purchase patterns at other stores in the non-qualifying categories. For customers located
in relatively isolated regions, we see that the gains from focal category purchases tend to be offset
by declines in other purchase categories.





































Figure 2: Change in Monthly Spend by Competitor Type and Purchase Category
One potential concern would be if the firm were conducting location based targeted marketing
during our data time frame, in which case the observed differences in spending patterns may be
correlated with marketing activity. Fortunately our data contain information on emails sent to each
customer. 13 As our findings show later, this suggests that the focal firm may be mis-targeting
its spending by focusing solely on spending differences rather than targeting based on customer
location and competitive structure. We also show that the marketing activity does not change for
customers upon joining the LP.
Figure 3 displays a variety of change metrics based on a median split of five metrics of interest:
qualified spending levels prior to joining the LP, number of stores visited, and the three distance
metrics of interest: customer-store, customer-competition, and store-competition. In the figure,
we show both the change in qualified and non-qualified spend, along with the combined change
in spend (shown, as before, as a black square). Overall, we see the change in sales is higher for
customers 1) with relatively low qualified spend prior to joining the LP, 2) who visit more than
two stores pre-join, 3) who are relatively far from the focal store, 4) who are relatively close to the
competition, and 5) who shop at stores relatively close to a competitor.
13In the web appendix we show that marketing activity is correlated with spending activity, but found no evidence
that email activity is targeted based on location.
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Figure 3: Change in Monthly Spend by Median Split (All Joiners)
Patterns Among Profitable Joiners: In this final section of the descriptive analysis, we investi-
gate other changes in behavior within the customers who increase spending upon joining the LP to
determine if there are patterns as to what is driving the positive change in spend. We focus on using
the non-spatial variables to see if we might identify segments to provide insight into specifically how
engagement with the LP changes upon joining.
In Table 7 we provide a cross-tabulation of selected measures of shopping behavior for these
customers. The cells indicate the proportion of customers that fall into each quadrant. We construct
the quadrants based on whether there is a substantial increase (which we define as at least a 15%
increase in the metric) or if the behavior is flat or even decreasing. For example, of the customers
with a positive change in spend, 13.9% of them showed no appreciable increase in trip frequency
paired with a significant increase basket size. Within each cell we also note the average increase in
spending upon joining and standard errors to highlight the across-customer and within-customer
heterogeneity and relative value of each segment.
As expected, most consumers show an increase in the given variables, since we are selecting only
customers who increase spending overall. Of greater interest are the customers who land in the
off-diagonal groups - that is, customers who exhibit a positive change in one metric at the expense
of a negative change in another. In the web appendix we provide additional information about the
customers within these off-diagonal cells, namely their pre-join behavior and simple spatial metrics.
The first cross tabulation shows that more than one third of those who increase spending do so
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via increased trip frequency but with no increase in per-trip basket size. This behavior is consistent
with consolidating purchases from multiple competing stores to only the focal store after joining the
LP and we refer to this group as consolidators. The average change in spend of this group at $749 is
nearly twice that of the complementary group, who increase basket size but not trip frequency. This
is despite the fact that in the complementary table these customers (in the “lower left” cell) have
similar pre-join spending levels as those in the opposite cell (“top right”). The web appendix shows
detailed information on the characteristics in each of these customers. For example, the spatial
information provides some indication of why these customers may have proven to be so valuable.
The more valuable group is actually further away from the focal stores, at a distance of more than
10km versus about 8km, and on average but essentially the same distance to the competition. That
is, it appears that after joining the customers shift trips that occur elsewhere to the focal store.
The middle cross-tabulation compares changes in number of items purchased and the average
price per item. The largest group increases spending by buying more items but without a substantial
increase in average price. But about 31% of customers show no increase in basket size but a
substantial increase in the price paid per item, suggesting that these customers may be responding
to the LP discounts either by upgrading to more expensive items after joining the LP or shifting
higher purchases away from competitor stores. We refer to this group as upgraders. These customers
also increase their total spending by more than twice as much as those who simply buy more items.
Finally, the bottom cross-tabulation shows again that close to a third of customers have no
increase in qualified sales but a substantial increase in non-qualified sales. In terms of change in
spend upon joining, those in the top right cell are more than five times more valuable than those
in the lower left cell, even though the pre-join sales per month are actually lower. This behavior
is again consistent with being a consolidator, shifting non-qualified spending in response to joining
the LP.
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∆ Basket Size (# Items)
Flat/Decrease Sig. Increase
∆ Trip Frequency Flat/Decrease 14.4% 13.9%
$814 ($495) $312 ($88)
Sig. Increase 35.8% 35.8%
$749 ($187) $1,094 ($183)
∆ Price/Item
Flat/Decrease Sig. Increase
∆ Basket Size (# Items) Flat/Decrease 19.4% 30.8%
$233 ($56) $1,103 ($307)
Sig. Increase 34.3% 15.4%
$591 ($78) $1,506 ($391)
∆ Non-Qualified Sales
Flat/Decrease Sig. Increase
∆ Qualified Sales Flat/Decrease 4.0% 27.9%
$59 ($22) $636 ($191)
Sig. Increase 12.4% 55.7%
$115 ($30) $1,125 ($185)
Table 7: Positive ∆ Sales|Join Proportions and ∆ Sales
4 LASSO Regularization and Competitive Segmentation
In this section we propose and estimate a model of how customer behavior changes after joining the
loyalty program. This model takes as inputs detailed data on pre-join spending patterns as well as
complex representations of the spatial relationships between customers and their local competitive
structures. We broadly define these data on past spending patterns as capturing vertical quality or
the value of a customer in terms of their overall demand, and define the data on local competitive
structures as capturing horizontal quality or how likely it is to shift a customers spending from a
competitor’s store to the focal store. While spending at competitors is unobserved, spatial data
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can help fill this role. Estimating a model with these two inputs serves two purposes. First, we
can analyze the estimation results directly to compare the relative importance of our competitive
structure (horizontal) variables and traditional factors determining LP effectiveness like sales history
(vertical) variables. This comparison of their relative importance is informative on how LPs manage
to increase spending, i.e., via demand expansion or business stealing.
Second, the estimation provides a segmentation strategy for a firm seeking to improve LP
effectiveness by providing causal predictions of which customer segments are the most likely to
increase spending based on their past spending histories and unique competitive structures. The
wide variation across customers’ change in spending suggests the gains from segmentation strategies
can be quite large. In particular, we show that incorporating customer spatial data into a location-
based eligibility criteria can substantially increase LP profitability.
We face two challenges in this estimation. The first is that the decision to join the loyalty
program must be treated as endogenous to change in spending. That is, the customer may join
the loyalty program in part because of an anticipated change in spend. To overcome this source
of endogeneity, we jointly model the decision to join and the subsequent change in spending and
correct for potential selection bias using a control function approach. The second challenge is
that representing the nuances of various competitive structures leads to the creation of a very
large number of potentially highly correlated variables. To handle this complexity, we employ
regularization methods to identify the spatial covariates that are most relevant. Our research
objective, along with these challenges, inform the development of our modeling approach.
We therefore estimate a two-stage model, the first stage of which is a model of which customers
join the loyalty program as a function of their observable characteristics, including their spending
history inside and outside the focal category and their spatial competitive structure. The goal of
the first stage is to model customer self-selection into the program in order to account for this in
the second stage. The second stage is a model of the change in spending conditional on joining
the LP as a function of a customer’s spending history and local competitive structure. Because the
data are high-dimensional, the problem is well-suited to statistical methods built around dimension
reduction or “regularization”. We ultimately use a LASSO approach because this will allow us to test
inclusion of a large number of possible spatial measures and let the model select the most important
variables. The output also provides a clearer interpretation than other methods, allowing us to easily
identify and assess which individual factors best predict LP effectiveness. In addition, we emphasize
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that our goal is to not identify the best estimation method for predicting changes in spend, but
instead our focus is on introducing novel variables (such as spatial information) into the model
and show how even with a simple framework, such as LASSO, the spatial information is valuable.
Certainly, the overall out-of-sample predictive power is likely to improve as the methods become
more sophisticated, such as with random forests or extreme gradient boosting, but accounting for
self-selection using these methods is not straightforward. Thus, if for instance the data on LP
outcomes was the result of a randomized experiment and therefore it was not necessary to correct
for selection bias, one of these more complex methods could be used in place of the LASSO we
estimate. Finally, the results can be used to assess whether the vertical measures representing
spending-based customer value or the horizontal variables representing location-based customer
vulnerability to competitors are more important for determining behavior. In our discussion of
the results we show how this comparison is informative of how and when quantity discounts or
behavior-based pricing schemes are likely to succeed.
4.1 Two-Stage Model of LP Effects
In this subsection we provide an overview of our estimation method and in the next subsection
we discuss the details of how we implement it, including what variables and functional forms are
employed.
The decision to join a loyalty program is complex. Customers may join loyalty programs for
a variety of reasons, including utilitarian (e.g., discounts), hedonic (e.g., personalized treatment),
and symbolic (e.g., social status) (Bijmolt et al. (2011)). We expect this decision to be based on
both observed characteristics, such as distance to the store, as well as unobserved characteristics,
such as anticipated changes in behavior. This self-selection into the program could generate biased
estimates because joiners have different unobserved shocks than non-joiners.
Our empirical strategy is built on a two-stage approach that is modified to account for the
high-dimensional spatial information. The model consists of a first stage join decision, where we
model the indirect utility of joining the LP as:
uis = f(X1is, X2is, Zis) + µis + ηis (1)
We include three types of variables in the join decision, X1 contains the spatial competitive
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structure parameters between customer i and focal store location s and X2 contains firm-level
marketing and store-specific customer purchase behavior. We also allow for additional variables Z
that can be used to increase the identifying power of the selection correction in the second stage
model. We describe each of these in greater detail below. The error term ηis is an idiosyncratic
shock and µis is an additional shock that we interpret as a private information shock related to
planned spending known to the customer at the time they decide whether or not to join the LP.
Both are IID and mean zero. The first stage results in a binary choice of join or do not join as a
function of this indirect utility.
In the second stage, we model the change in spending as:
yis = g1(X1is, X2is) + g2(µis) + εis (2)
Here εis is an unobserved, normally distributed random error centered at zero and represents
idiosyncratic shocks to spending and µis is the same shock from equation 1 that represents the
source of selection bias. The functions g1(·) and g2(·) will be described in detail below. We again
split the observable characteristics into two sets to highlight the fact that our goal is evaluate
the relative importance of two types of inputs to our model. X1 contains the spatial relationship
between the customer and nearby stores and X2 contains firm-level marketing and store-specific
customer purchase behavior.
The purpose of the first stage model is to simply produce a consistent estimate of the probability
of joining which can be entered into the second stage as a control function. If the predicted
probability of joining is P̂is(X1is, X2is, Zis), we can re-write equation 2 as:
yis = g1(X1is, X2is) + Λ(P̂is) + εis (3)
In the classic Heckman (1979) classic selection model, the first stage is estimated as a probit
in which case Λ(P̂is) takes the form of the inverse Mills ratio λ(f̂(X1is, X2is, Zis)). Without this
correction, if µis is correlated with εis the coefficients of g1(·) could be biased. While this standard
formulation can be estimated using the same set of observed characteristics (X1, X2) in the first
and second stages, i.e. with no excluded variables, this approach has been found to suffer from
high collinearity and to produce very large standard errors (see Wooldridge (2002) chapter 17.4.1).
We therefore include a set of first stage variables Zis that influence join probabilities but do not
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influence the second stage outcome yis and are excluded from the second stage model.
14 These are
described in more detail below.
We also generalize the basic model by taking a control function approach: see Heckman and
Robb Jr (1985); Heckman and Robb (1986) and Ahn and Powell (1993) for an introduction and
extensions to semi-parametric control functions. As in Ellickson and Misra (2012), we let Λ(·) take
polynomials of P̂is, the main advantage being it does not require parametric assumptions on the
error structure such as joint normality.15 The construction of Λ(·) on P̂is should be as flexible as
possible since the true functional form can rarely be specified a priori. Intuitively, Λ(·) serves a
similar purpose as an inverse Mills ratio by correcting potential selection bias in the second stage
model.
Next, our method allows that the set of spatial variables X1 is a potentially high dimensional
object and may also contain variables that are highly correlated with each other. Because of the
problems this can cause in selection models (Leung and Yu (1996)) we use regularization when
estimating both g1(X1is, X2is) in the second stage and f(X1is, X2is, Zis) in the first stage. In both
cases we use LASSO regularization. This approach is similar to the widely used Belloni et al.
(2014) double-lasso procedure for conducting causal inference with large numbers of variables. Our
approach is different in that the first stage LASSO is used in the context of a control function and
instead of attempting to conduct inference over a single treatment effect our goal is to measure the
relative importance of a large number of potential explanatory variables.
First, we run a LASSO regression on the full set of variables (X1is, X2is, Zis) to predict the join
probability. Then we estimate change in spending yis with LASSO regularization on (X1is, X2is)
after offsetting the control function Λ(P̂is).
16 Intuitively, this method works by modeling the join
decision as a function of observed characteristics in order to recover the extent to which customers
have a large or small private information shock to the value of joining. If a consumer has a very high
probability of joining according to their observed characteristics, for instance a high level of spending
in the focal category, the expected value of the private information shock is low. By contrast, if
14An alternative method that also does not require excluded variables would be to estimate the two-stage model
in a Bayesian framework, as in Ghose and Yang (2009). For a full discussion of the identification and use of models
of marketing actions with sample selection, see Wachtel and Otter (2013).
15For other recent examples of control functions to correct selection bias in marketing, see Jain et al. (2020),
Phillips et al. (2015), or Nambiar et al. (2019), which combines a control function estimation with a variant of ridge
regression.
16This method is similar to Xu et al. (2020) and Cook and Siddiqui (2020) (who use Random Forest instead of
LASSO).
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a consumer has a very low probability of joining according to their observed characteristics the
expected value of their private information shock must be high if we observe them joining. This
selection correction term therefore accounts for the unobserved determinants of the join decision
in the second stage change in spending. This approach will thereby eliminate or reduce any bias
induced by self-section and improve the model’s accuracy.
4.2 Model Implementation
We split the second stage observable characteristics into two sets to highlight the fact that our goal
is evaluate the relative importance of two types of inputs to our model. X1is contains the spatial
competitive structure metrics between customer i at focal store location s and X2is contains firm-
level marketing and store-specific customer purchase behavior. The metrics in X1is are intended to
jointly capture the complex spatial relationships between the customer, focal store, and competitors.
Since there can be more than one focal store in the vicinity of an individual, these metrics vary
across each store s for a given individual i. Likewise, since each customer’s location is unique, the
spatial metrics also vary across each individual i from all observations for store s.
For X1is we include traditional spatial metrics such as distance between the focal store and the
customer and distance between the customer and each competitor, along with more novel measures
such as the angle formed between the focal store and the nearest competitor (intended to reflect
whether a change in travel direction is required to switch store purchasing). The full list of the
metrics created is shown in the appendix. Our aim is to represent the competitive structure in
the most flexible way feasible, and then call upon regularization to identify which features of the
competitive structure are most related to changes in spend behavior.
X2is includes traditional recency, frequency, and monetary value (RFM) variables along with
basket specific metrics: monthly trip frequency, overall sales, distinct number of items, number of
product categories, basket size, discounts received, sales in the category of interest, and sales in the
category of interest for those products that are included in the limited LP.
We also include a variable Zis that serves to facilitate the selection correction approach in that
it enters the first stage model but is excluded from the second stage model. To be effective, this
variable needs to be correlated with the decision to join the LP in the first stage, uis, but have no
direct effect on the change in monthly spend in the second stage. To satisfy this condition, we use
an indicator of whether a customer received an email specifically encouraging them to join the LP.
25
We argue that this variable should influence the short term decision to join the LP, but does not
directly impact longer term changes in average monthly spend. The first stage effects are testable
and we discuss them when we estimate the first stage model.17
The primary concern with using a marketing variables such as this is if it is targeted in a way
that makes it correlated with the second stage outcome variable change-in-spend. We argue that
while these are likely correlated with pre-join spending levels, a large set of these spending-related
variables are already included as covariates in the second stage model. Beyond each of these,
the firm would need to target on unobserved characteristics related to change-in-spend, which
seems unlikely given the results already shown. An important potential variable for LP targeting
is customer location. We test for targeting on location and find no evidence for location-based
targeting of marketing.18.
LASSO Estimation Our proposed model contains a large number of spatial variables defined
to capture the competitive structure. On the one hand, capturing the spatial relationship between
the customer, focal store, and competitors is complex and may require many variables. However,
all else being equal a concise model is preferable from a managerial standpoint. In addition, many
of the spatial metrics we devised may be redundant or highly correlated with each other. To
systematically remove variables that are either unnecessary or redundant we employ the Least
Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) estimator, introduced by Frank and Friedman
(1993) and Tibshirani (1996).










Where L is the likelihood of data given the model specified, and λ is a tuning parameter that
represents the penalty incurred if we choose a nonzero value for any parameter θk. This approach
regulates the trade-off between an accurate model with more predictive power and a concise model
17We also estimated the model with an additional four other instrumental variables, these are: proportion of
customer sales in the LP category, an indicator for receiving any marketing email, the number of days between
receiving the LP promotion email and the next in-category purchase, and the number of days between receiving the
LP promotion email and the next purchase qualifying for LP discounts. The model with all of these instruments
included in the first stage performs very similarly to the model with only the LP promotion email variable.
18We show these results in the web appendix
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that is more readily interpretable by managers.19 We select the tuning parameter λ through ten
fold cross-validation, which is perhaps the simplest and most widely used method for this task.20
4.3 Estimation Results
The results from the LASSO estimation are presented in Table 8. For model validation purposes,
we split the original data where 75% of the customers are placed into the training set and 25% into
the test set. The results presented below were estimated using the training set alone, while the test
set is used to evaluate performance. For brevity, the table only displays variables that are retained
in at least one of the two models.
We begin with a review of the first stage results of the join incidence, with an emphasis on the
performance of our exclusion variable: an indicator for whether an email was sent to the customer
encouraging them to join the LP. Then, we move to the second stage results of changes in monthly
spend.
4.3.1 First Stage Results: Exclusion Restrictions and Join Probabilities
The primary purpose of the first stage model is to provide estimates to be used for our control func-
tion approach to correct for potential selection bias. Because of this, we focus on the performance
of the variable used to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
The first stage model shows that the exclusion restriction was retained by the LASSO regu-
larization, with the coefficient in the expected positive direction. It’s important to recognize that
the typical constructs like p-values do not exist for LASSO estimates (Lockhart et al. (2014)), so
additional care may be required to measure significance, at least in the usual statistical sense. Be-
cause of this, as a robustness check we also estimate the first stage model using a post-LASSO
approach, in the style of Belloni et al. (2013). Specifically, we use the LASSO results to identify
which variables to then use in a standard logistic regression. The results are presented in the web
appendix and show similar results to LASSO: the exclusion variable coefficient is significant with
19An alternative approach would be a ridge regression or similar method. In this case the penalty is applied more
smoothly, shrinking coefficients on highly correlated variables towards each other. We prefer the LASSO approach
because the penalty structure removes coefficients entirely, resulting in clearer model interpretation. Specifically,
we can see that many non-spatial variables will drop out altogether. This result is a notable output of interest. A
ridge regression would lack this clean interpretation but would result in similar quantitative predictions and can be
provided upon request.
20See James et al. (2013) for more information.
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nearly the same coefficient estimate.21
4.3.2 Second Stage: Change in Monthly Spend
In this section we show the second stage results. We in particular are interested in to what extent
competitive structure metrics serve as important determinants of the estimated LP effectiveness, as
measured by change in monthly spending at the focal store, conditional on joining the firm’s loyalty
program. Recall the dependent variable in this estimation is the change in average monthly spend
after joining the loyalty program, net of any LP discounts. We focus on average monthly spend to
account for different lengths of data before and after the customer joins. In addition, for estimation
we only included customers who had at least some spending both before and after joining.
First, there is a positive impact on the squared distance between the customer and the focal
store, suggesting that the greater gains come from those located further away from the focal store.
The distance between the customer and the competition also influences changes in spend at the
focal store. Customers who exhibit the largest changes in spend are those who are relatively far
from the the big-box generalist (ic1sq) and the second small-box generalist (ic3sq) and close to the
other competitors, holding all other variables constant.
Many of the radius band coefficients drop out of this model. However, we see that the intercept
angle is retained. The difference in the estimated change in spend for a customer where a big-box
(BB) competitor is in the same line of travel as the focal store (intercept angle of zero) versus in
the opposite direction (intercept angle of 180 degrees) is about $132, holding all other variables
constant. This is a non-trivial amount that cannot be captured using traditional spatial measures.
Finally, population density along with its interactions with the direct distance measures has
a significant impact on the change in monthly spend. For instance, increases in the distance
between the store and the customer influence customers in dense areas more negatively, relative
to customers in less dense areas. This appears to be capturing the challenges of traveling in more
densely populated areas (e.g., traveling a given distance in a city versus a rural setting).
As previously argued, the construction of our exclusion variable, along with their estimation
results, lend credibility in our attempt to control for selection bias in the second stage variables.
We are also able to take advantage of the unique LP design to conduct an additional robustness
21Due to the regularization method in LASSO, there is a tendency to bias estimates towards zero. In the post-
LASSO results, the exclusion variable coefficient exhibits a slightly higher magnitude than the coefficient in the main
LASSO table.
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check. In the results table we include a column where the estimation proceeds as before but only
using the change in spending on products that do not qualify for the LP discounts. Comparing this
column and the column for all spending shows a very high correlation in the LASSO coefficients and
in which variables are retained. Since the products retained for the third column do not qualify for
the LP discount, there is less reason to expect selection bias to be present. More specifically, there
is no incentive for customers to self-select into the LP in the anticipation of spending changes on
products that will cost exactly the same even after joining. Given that the coefficients in the last
two columns are similar, we are confident that either a) our control function approach is effective or
b) self-selection was not a prominent issue in this data. In either case, our second stage coefficients
are credible.
4.3.3 Summary
The LASSO results suggest that the customer behavior appears to be strongly influenced by the
competitive structure of the local market. The regularization tends to keep quite a few of the
spatial metrics, suggesting that relatively simple distance metrics are, on their own, unable to fully
characterize the observed changes in spending.22
22In Appendix 2, we provide additional support that the spatial variables appear to explain a substantial portion
of the variation in join and change in spend activity relative to the other types of variables.
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Table 8: Lasso Pr(Join) and Change in Sales|Join
Coefficient Pr(Join) Change in Sales|Join Change in Non-Qualified Sales|Join
1 (Intercept) -3.4715 69.6390 33.0500
2 sisq 0.0240 0.0341
3 ic2 0.0015
4 ic3 0.0054
5 ic1sq 0.2201 0.2074
6 ic2sq 1.7812e-05 -0.1244 -0.1313
7 ic3sq 0.1360 0.1281
8 ic4sq -9.4303e-05 -0.1319 -0.0963
9 sc1 0.0018
10 sc1sq 7.3865e-05 -0.0671 -0.0568
11 sc2sq -0.0521 -0.0315
12 sc3sq 4.4618e-05 -0.1154 -0.1193




















33 cInt1: BB intercept angle 0.0015 0.7313 0.8035
34 cInt2: SB1 intercept angle -0.4303 -0.4002
35 cInt3: SB2 intercept angle 4.8686e-04 0.6361 0.6281
36 ccbar_1 (avg. BB-BB comp. center km) -0.0132
37 ccbar_2 (avg. SB1-SB1 comp. center km) 0.0090 1.1359 0.7375
38 ccbar_3 (avg. SS-SB2 comp. center km) -0.1173 -0.2115
39 icbar_2 (avg. customer-SB1 km) 0.0049
40 icbar_3 (avg. customer-SB2 km) 0.0040
41 icbar_4 (avg. customer-SS km) -2.3757e-04
42 Trips/month (pre LP) 0.0105 -29.2049 -26.8155
43 Total sales (pre LP) 1.2235e-04 0.0020 -0.0008
44 Total sales in LP category (pre LP) 0.0014 0.1340 0.1318
45 Total qualified sales in LP category (pre LP) -0.1077 -0.0422
46 Number of focal stores w/i 60km 0.0033 1.2386 1.2109
47 Population Density (in sq miles) 0.0234 0.0216
48 Population Density x si -0.0021 -0.0019
49 Population Density x ic1 -0.0020 -0.0018
50 Population Density x ic2 -0.0015 -0.0016
51 Population Density x ic3 1.3543e-07 4.7953e-04 4.2953e-04
52 Population Density x ic4 0.0038 0.0037
53 Population Density x sc1 3.9140e-07 4.6566e-04 3.1972e-04
54 Population Density x sc2 0.0019 0.0014
55 Population Density x sc3 -0.0009 -1.2181e-04
56 Population Density x sc4 -0.0024 -0.0025
57 distinctSKU -2.7266
58 numItems 0.0016 -4.3539 -4.0296
59 distinctCategories -0.0591
60 discountNonLP
61 p̂1 -3366.1949 -2632.1819
62 p̂2 32697.6698 24970.3811
63 p̂3 -80077.3766 -60219.1325
64 p̂4 44858.4371 33375.0807
65 p̂5 43436.2478 32064.9694
66 p̂6 -38301.0526 -28317.7993
67 Received promotional email for LP 1.3717
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4.4 Visual Representation of Results
Even after LASSO variable reduction, it is still difficult to concisely describe how the competitive
structure influences estimated changes in spend due to the codependency between variables. We
therefore illustrate the results visually. For brevity, we limit our discussion to two heatmaps that
show the predicted change in spending for hypothetical customers in different competitive struc-
tures. Additional heatmaps are provided in the web appendix. These maps show large heterogeneity
across different customers. However, since these maps are mostly stylized representations of the
actual data we focus on comparing the magnitudes across maps rather than specific prediction
levels.
Figure 4 plots all four competitors, each an equal distance from the focal store. The color on
the heatmap reflects the estimated change in spend from a customer in that position if they were
to join the LP, with shades closer to white representing greater increases. This map shows that
most of the gains are from customers near the big-box generalist, and less so from the small-box
specialist. This map highlights that the value of a potential customer is heavily dependent on the


























Figure 4: All Competitors
Figure 5 illustrates the predicted effects from an actual competitive structure randomly drawn
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from the data. Customers located on the far side of the second small-box specialist (SB2), and the
big-box generalist (BB), have the lowest predicted change in spend. These customers are relatively
far away from the focal store with a competitor directly in their path of travel. On the other hand,
the other two competitors (SB1 and SS) are relatively close and the line of travel is not as critical.
The customers that show the most promise are those that are close to the focal store but in the
direction of the second small box generalist (SB2) and the big-box generalist (BB).
We also included two customer locations (I1 and I2) to show the impacts of the competitive
structure. The first customer, I1, is halfway between the focal store and the second small box
competitor (SB2). This customer has relatively high predicted change in spend because of the
potential to consolidate purchases. In contrast, the second customer, I2, is located right near two




























Figure 5: Randomly Selected Competitive Structure
The heatmaps presented convey two key advantages of this analysis. First, the geographic
influence of a competitor is relatively complex. Simple radii surrounding either the customer or
the store would not perform well at capturing the influence of competitive structure. Second, these
relationships are not fixed and vary by the type of competitor in an area. This is an important for
the firm to consider when forming of targeting strategies.
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4.5 Competitive Segmentation: Out of Sample Validation
In this section we show the effectiveness of our model by using it to implement a segmentation
strategy and comparing its performance to a variety of different potential segmentation and tar-
geting strategies. We show that our approach performs best at identifying the most valuable LP
joiners, particularly compared with more traditional approaches that ignore customer and competi-
tor spatial information. This exercise serves two purposes, first to provide validity to our second
stage model coefficient estimates using out of sample predictions, and second to demonstrate the
usefulness of incorporating spatial information into models of customer behavior.
To do so, for each potential segmentation strategy we construct an LP eligibility rule. These
eligibility rules range from simple criteria based on spending history or location up to a full im-
plementation of our spatial LASSO model’s ex-ante prediction of which customers are likely to be
profitable. This type of LP eligibility criteria differs from the standard practice of allowing any
customer to join the LP and replaces it with a more restrictive and targeted LP membership to
increase profits.
This allows us to evaluate each strategy by directly comparing outcomes only among different
subsets of customers who actually joined, reducing concerns around self-selection into the LP.
To evaluate the increase in profits from each type of targeting, we use a validation or holdout
sample of customers who were not used in estimation. We then measure the success of each
segmentation approach by calculating the actual observed change in spending from those customers
whose predicted incremental profits from joining the LP is positive. This means we do not need to
make predictions of how spending would change among customers we do not observe joining the
LP in order to compare performance of different segmentation strategies.
While strict eligibility criteria are rare, this exercise produces the clearest comparisons in terms of
hypothetical increases in profits. An alternative method of implementing this type of segmentation
that does not rely on strict eligibility criteria would be to not restrict LP membership but simply
to sharply reduce promotion of the LP to the general public and carefully target promotion of
the LP to the target segment. In this case, we would expect in practice that some unprofitable
joiners would join along with the more profitable target segment, but the comparison across target
segments is still informative.
It is important to note that these counterfactuals implicitly hold fixed the amount, intensity,
and type of advertising sent to customers, other than LP promotion advertising, because we rely
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on actual observed spending levels before and after they join in order to evaluate them. If in
the counterfactual scenario the focal firm changed prices, advertising, or other marketing activity
other than LP eligibility, we would not necessarily expect these patterns to hold, particularly if the
marketing was targeted based on customer location unlike its current strategy of targeting based
on spending levels.
Rule-of-Thumb Segmentation Strategies:
The performance of numerous different potential segmentation rules are shown in Table 9. We
first describe a series of simple segmentation criteria that rely on simple location or spending based
rules-of-thumb. In each case we compare the performance of these rules by evaluating the total
change in spending of all customers who would be identified by the rule. We also include the
estimated dispersion in the average predicted change in spend.23
First, a mass marketing strategy would avoid segmentation altogether and treat the customers as
a homogeneous group. In aggregate, customers show a slightly positive change in monthly spending
after joining. This is consistent with the descriptive result that spending only mildly increases on
average after customers join the LP. This strategy emphasizes the general lack of profitability in
the LP within the self-selected set of joiners.24
We also consider a simple strategy based on vertical quality, consisting of focusing on only those
that exhibit relatively high spending amounts (prior to joining the LP) at a few reasonable cutoff
points (based on the empirical distribution of monthly spend at a single store location). As noted
in Section 3, this is close to the actual way in which the focal firm conducts targeting. We consider
three levels as a cutoff: $80 (the median), $100, and $200 (about the 75th quantile). In each of
these the change in monthly spend actually declines substantially. Segmentation in this manner
would therefore be a highly unprofitable strategy.
Next we consider a naive location-based strategy that selects customers within a few kilometers
of the focal store. If we limit attention to only those customers within 5 kilometers of the target store
we get a small positive boost, which is only slightly stronger than a mass marketing approach. A
23The standard errors were derived using bootstrapping. Within each targeting strategy, we sample with replace-
ment from the observations targeted and calculate the average change in spend for that sample. The standard error
is the standard deviation of this statistic across many such samples.
24We would expect the predictions to be biased upwards relative to the causal treatment effect due to potential
planned increases in spending from joiners. However, we can use our model to estimate the change in spend for all
current non-joiners and we find that this group would increase spending by $15.58 ($1.52) per month on average
(higher than the effect from actual joiners). This is evidence of adverse selection where less profitable customers are
more likely to join the LP. We also consider this noteworthy because this increase is still quite low, and is substantially
lower than each of the segmentation methods we consider, highlighting the valud of targeting the program.
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second type of naive location-based segmentation would be to try to take advantage of the business
stealing aspect of loyalty programs by focusing on all customers located near a competitor. We test
this strategy and find that customers within 5 km of a competitor exhibit a substantial decrease in
profits.
Model-Based Spatial Segmentation Strategies:
Next, we compare several series of models distinguished by which data are used as inputs as
well as how they are estimated. Each model is estimated on the training observations and validated
on the holdout set. Note that we expect a higher degree of noise between the train and test set
than in other applications, particularly LASSO applications, because we are not simply estimating
change in spend but estimating a model of change in spend and then grouping all customers with
a predicted spend greater than zero and measuring actual observed performance.
We start by focusing on different methods for including limited spatial data to derive some
insight into how local competitive structure effects LP performance. We specify three relatively
simple spatial models that considers only distances between the focal store and customer and each
of the four competitors. Out-of-sample performance is actually worse using these metrics alone,
but improves substantially when augmented with metrics that convey additional information on
the competitor locations: the number of competitors within the average driving distance of 10km,
and the degree to which a focal store is in the same line of travel as a competitor.
Our next three spatial models are variations of gravity models in the spirit of Huff (1964), which
date back to Reilly (1931), who coined the term “law of retail gravitation”. We find the gravity mod-
els outperform the mass marketing approach and the rule-of-thumb strategies but exhibit similar
results to the augmented simple spatial models. More details on the six spatial model specifications
are available in the appendix.
Finally, we compare each of these spatial models to a model that considers only vertical quality
or historical sales information: overall sales, category level sales, and category level sales that
specifically qualify for the LP. This model also under performs a mass segmentation approach and
results in negative profits, suggesting that these data alone have low predictive power and are prone
to overfitting.
LASSO Model-Based Segmentation Strategies:
Finally, we estimate a series of models using our preferred LASSO approach.
The first model uses the LASSO approach but ignores competitor spatial information. We
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estimate the model using traditional RFM metrics alone. This model outperforms all others thus
far both in-sample and out-of-sample, attesting to the strength of using the LASSO approach as a
baseline for identifying important determinants of profitability.
Next, we show results for our preferred spatial LASSO. Here we augment the LASSO RFM
model with the spatial information of the competition. It outperforms all other segmentation
strategies in the validation sample, where the customers identified exhibit an actual change in
sales over ten times higher than those in a mass marketing targeting scheme. The improvements
compared to the RFM LASSO model are also substantial: about a 40% increase in the out-of-sample
change in sales and 64% increase in non-qualified sales, with each pairwise comparison being highly
statistically significant. In short, the spatial LASSO does the best job of identifying which customer
characteristics cause LP joiners to be valuable to the firm.
Finally, we compare the performance of an RFM approach to a spatial approach when estimated
and validated separately in competitive and isolated markets.25 The spatial model outperforms the
RFM only model in all comparisons where the market type (isolated or competitive) or data subset
(train or test) is held constant.
The comparisons across model inputs and market types are informative. The RFM only model
performs nearly as well as the spatial model at identifying more valuable customers in isolated
markets but substantially worse in competitive markets. The spatial model, by contrast, performs
similarly in competitive markets as in isolated markets. This shows how the data on vertical
characteristics adds value mostly in settings where customers are not vulnerable to competition.
The spatial data adds value regardless of market type. These results are broadly informative on how
2nd degree price discrimination (quantity discounts or behavior-based pricing) and 3rd degree price
discrimination (targeted price discounts) interact in practice. Properly designed quantity discounts
should be profitable by increasing spending by high value customers. Therefore, in isolated markets
it is effective to target these discounts using a measure of vertical quality constructed from past
sales data. The quantity discounts work by letting customers self-select into the discounts based on
their level of spending and marginal demand. In markets with close competitors, targeting can be
done based on the horizontal vulnerability dimension and within the targeted group customers will
self-select into the discounts based on vertical characteristics. It is better then to target customers
who might shift their purchases away from competitors than to target the highest value customers
25These market types are defined in section 3.
36
alone, since they may not change their spending at all in response to the LP discounts.
Avg. ∆ Sales Avg. ∆ Non-Qual. Sales
Targeting Strategy Train Test SE Train Test
Mass Marketing $6.91 $10.80 $2.59
Top spender (>$80) -$38.10 $15.67 -$33.29
Top spender (>$100) -$45.16 $16.88 -$40.19
Top spender (>$200) -$103.67 $23.87 -$95.73
Within 5 kilometers of focal store $12.60 $18.89 $13.23
Within 5 kilometers of any competitor -$54.54 $22.27 -$41.93
Simple spatial $40.72 $3.97 $2.41 $31.30 $3.69
Simple spatial w/ competitors in 10km radius $38.85 $31.91 $2.68 $33.09 $27.77
Simple spatial w/ apex angle $40.09 $26.73 $3.20 $33.32 $20.27
Gravity fixed w (α̂ = .227, .232) $13.76 $20.16 $8.59 $13.11 $22.34
Gravity estimated w (α̂ = .039, .041) $11.05 $24.90 $1.61 -$4.28 $30.47
Gravity αk $17.93 $19.43 $8.37 $17.80 $13.90
Historical sales only $29.06 -$23.06 $1.84 $36.52 -$12.46
LASSO RFM only $80.92 $57.53 $3.52 $69.92 $42.01
LASSO RFM & Spatial $96.54 $80.59 $7.41 $86.32 $68.90
LASSO RFM only (Competitive) $59.78 $31.77 $7.45 $57.83 $32.36
LASSO RFM only (Isolated) $88.49 $65.33 $4.04 $73.84 $44.93
LASSO RFM & Spatial (Competitive) $86.66 $85.19 $20.26 $82.62 $79.02
LASSO RFM & Spatial (Isolated) $99.43 $79.10 $7.19 $87.40 $65.64
Table 9: Targeting Validation Performance
In Table 10 we investigate the influence of our control function approach on targeting per-
formance. We see that the full model the selection correction generates a significant increase in
out-of-sample accuracy.
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Avg. ∆ Sales Avg. ∆ Non-Qual. Sales
Targeting Strategy Train Test SE Train Test
LASSO RFM only
No selection correction $78.15 $62.52 $2.62 $68.91 $48.60
With selection correction $80.92 $57.53 $ 3.52 $69.92 $42.01
LASSO RFM & Spatial
No selection correction $76.69 $44.84 $ 7.23 $67.65 $32.70
With selection correction $96.54 $80.59 $ 7.41 $86.32 $68.90
Table 10: LASSO Targeting with and without Selection Correction
One argument might be that since marketing is done via email and is relatively inexpensive, why
not simply send marketing campaigns to everyone and not bother with segmenting the customers?
The key here is that in some cases it might be preferable to limit LP enrollment to certain segments.
If the firm cannot prevent interested customers from joining its loyalty program, it can choose on
which customers to focus LP promotion. Identifying the right type of customer for this type of
promotion can substantially increase its profitability. While this has generally been known, we show
two distinct contributions. First, location data contributes substantial increases in profitability to
a segmentation strategy than historical sales patterns. Second, simply incorporating traditional
spatial metrics like distance between customer and store does not capture the complexity of com-
petitive structure. Instead, we show how firms could take advantage of rich spatial data on both
customers and competitors locations using a more sophisticated but still straightforward approach.
Comparison of Sales Predictions by Customer Type:
To better understand the contribution of horizontal variables in prediction exercise, we show how
the different segmentation strategies would select customers who differ on vertical and horizontal
metrics.
Table 11 presents the simplest spatial metrics (distances between the customer, focal store, and
each competitor) and monthly spending of the customers targeted in each strategy. Since there is
considerable overlap between the customers across these strategies, we parse out the observations
that were predicted to increase sales in the spatial LASSO but not by the alternative segmentation
strategies. In the table we label these as “missed” opportunities.
We see that customers idenfied as profitable by the model using traditional RFM metrics alone
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have lower pre-join sales per month relative to customers selected by the spatial LASSO and are
positioned significantly further from the focal store. This finding is made evident when looking at
the missed opportunities: these customers are much closer to the focal store and the sales per month
is much higher. The other distance metrics show that these customers and store locations also tend
to be closer to the competition. This emphasizes one of the key insights of the spatial model: on
average, regardless of location, customers with higher than average sales per month are unlikely to
show large increases in spend after joining the LP (likely because they are already dedicating most
spend to the focal store). However, we posit that customers located relatively closer to both the
focal store and the competition are more likely to consolidate purchases away from the competition
and will exhibit higher than average changes in spend upon joining.
We next evaluate the customers from the rule of thumb segmentation strategy that focuses on
customers close to the focal store. On average, customers close to the focal store are likely to have
access to a competitor as well, so at first glance these customers appear to be promising prospects
for targeting. However, they may be too close to the focal store, in the sense that they already
dedicate a substantial amount of spend to the focal store (as evidenced by the relative high sales
per month).
Finally, we consider the second Huff-style gravity model with estimated weights w, since, of the
gravity models, this variation best segmented customers. Under this model, valuable customers
are excluded simply because they are relatively far away from the focal store. However, for these
customers all four competitors are closer to the focal store, compared with customers identified by
the Huff model.
This analysis shows how the spatial LASSO model can capture more subtle drivers of customer
behavior that are typically missed when looking at transaction data alone (e.g., RFM variables)
or relatively simple spatial components. We find that there are substantial gains in segmentation




LASSO (RFM only) w/i 5km of Focal Store Gravity (est. w)
LASSO Targeted Missed Targeted Missed Targeted Missed
∆ Monthly Sales $80.59 $57.53 $98.41 $12.60 $69.39 $24.90 $61.25
∆ Qualified Sales $11.69 $15.52 $-8.89 $-0.63 $16.17 $0.15 $14.83
∆ Non-Qualified Sales $68.90 $42.01 $107.29 $13.23 $53.22 $24.75 $46.42
Sales/Month (pre join) $168.42 $139.51 $296.77 $424.25 $105.27 $385.13 $111.75
Sales/Month (pre join) SD $270.73 $216.91 $370.25 $534.57 $164.23 $482.54 $181.85
Sales/Month (pre join) 25th $20.61 $21.08 $105.73 $107.78 $15.48 $91.43 $15.42
Sales/Month (pre join) 75th $153.86 $131.67 $357.49 $507.74 $109.74 $473.77 $87.04
Sales/Month (post join) $249.93 $200.87 $395.18 $430.11 $176.60 $398.32 $179.90
si: Store-Customer (km) 9.69 13.35 7.53 3.00 13.23 5.20 14.47
ic1: Customer-BB (km) 14.78 14.95 15.72 13.00 15.60 14.28 14.28
ic2: Customer-SB1 (km) 14.20 16.54 13.65 15.55 14.51 14.44 15.58
ic3: Customer-SB2 (km) 17.08 16.89 19.81 14.98 18.23 17.14 17.52
ic4: Customer-SS (km) 15.37 16.37 15.05 13.62 16.32 14.69 15.73
sc1: Store-BB (km) 14.54 14.57 15.46 12.78 15.31 15.01 12.80
sc2: Store-SB2 (km) 14.52 16.26 14.70 15.47 15.02 14.34 15.75
sc3: Store-SB1 (km) 16.28 17.93 17.00 14.92 17.00 18.02 15.00
sc4: Store-SS (km) 14.39 15.10 14.13 13.55 14.80 15.15 12.96
Table 11: Targeted Customers
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Both academics and managers have been interested in understanding the factors contributing to a
successful loyalty program. We use a large new dataset on customer spending behavior at a major
U.S. retailer to develop a better understanding of the role of spatial relationships and competitive
structure in LP performance and in the effectiveness of price discrimination strategies more broadly.
We argue that a significant but largely overlooked driver of a loyalty program’s success is the joint
spatial relationship among the focal firm’s stores, the competition, and the customer, or what we
collectively label the competitive structure.
We first document large changes in behavior after joining the LP, with a wide degree of hetero-
geneity across customers. Notable among this customer heterogeneity are customer segments we
describe as consolidators or as upgraders. This heterogeneity suggests that targeting the LP with
promotions could be effective in dealing with the well-known issue that in many cases firms believe
that LPs fail to increase profits.
Second, we find model-free evidence that access to competitor stores is an indicator of whether
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a customer will increase spending upon joining the LP. This suggests that LPs using the common
form of quantity discounts work via business stealing rather than overall demand expansion. Third,
in informal comparisons we show that past spending behavior is not very predictive of how spending
will change when a customer joins the LP. These data are less predictive than spatial data and in
particular the more complex representations of spatial relationships.
We then develop formal models of how spending changes. This provides several important
results. First, segmentation for providing quantity discounts (or performing second degree price
discrimination) naively to the highest spenders would be very unprofitable. Naively segmenting
customers based on simple spatial rules would not be very effective either, performing roughly
the same as not treating all customers the same. Next, using LASSO to select among many
possible relationships in the estimation data helps determine what factors cause changes in spending
substantially better than simple models. Then, comparing performance of LASSO models relying on
vertical variables as inputs to using horizontal variables shows a substantial improvement associated
with the readily available spatial data.
These results suggest a segmentation strategy for firms interested in identifying their most
profitable customers. They are also informative regarding how and when second degree price
discrimination or one type of behavior-based pricing are likely to be successful. As Shin and
Sudhir (2010) note, it can profitable to use this type of pricing strategy if there exists substantial
heterogeneity in customer value and customer preferences are stochastic. Our results confirm this
insight and operationalize it by defining a customer’s vertical quality using past spending data and
their horizontal quality using spatial relationships to competitors and the focal store. Quantity
discounts based on vertical quality can be effective in relatively isolated markets but in competitive
settings targeting on horizontal variables is much more effective.
Still, our analysis is not without limitations. Due to the nature of the data we cannot make very
strong statements on the extent of business stealing that may be occurring. In the absence of data
from multiple competitors or direct responses from the customers themselves, we can only infer
the degree of business stealing based on changes in shopping behavior as a function of competitive
structure. We hope that our research provides the foundation for future work that integrates the
complex spatial information into models of customer behavior, especially in their relationship to
making more strategic firm decisions.
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Appendix 1: Distance Metrics
In the table below, x denotes the competitor type. In our empirical application this is either the
big box generalist (BB), the small box generalists (SB1 or SB2), or the small box specialist (SS).
Distance Metric Description
si Distance between the focal store s and individual i (in km)
icx Distance between the individual and competitor x (in km)
scx Distance between the focal store and competitor x (in km)
sx Sparsity metric for competitor x, defined as scx/(icx + si)
nAll_x Total number of x competitors within the region
nd_x Total number of x competitors within d km of the individual
cIntx
Angle formed between focal store and competitor with individual at apex
(0 means s and x are in same direction relative to c
180 means s in opposite direction of x)
icbar_x
Average km between the individual and each individual competitor x
(if only one competitor of type x in an area, this equals icx)
ccbar_x
Average km distance between each competitor and the competitive center
(if only one competitor of type x in an area, this equals 0)
Table A.1: Distance Metric Descriptions
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Appendix 2: Spatial Variable Contribution
In this supplementary section we provide an additional measure of the contribution of spatial
variables to the model fit relative to other types of variables. Specifically, we compare different
spatial model performance in targeting as well as highlight that our spatial metrics contribute
substantially more towards R2 relative to traditional vertical variables.
Discussion of Spatial Model Segmentation Performance
In this section we discuss the relative performance of different types of spatial models at profitably
segmenting LP customers. All the results discussed here correspond to Table 9. First we test a
simple spatial model that takes the standard approach to spatial data of only considering distances
between the focal store and customer and each of the four competitors. We see that the out-
of-sample performance is actually worse than a mass marketing approach. In other words, while
horizontal data is valuable in principle a simplistic approach to incorporating it that misses the
nuances of competitive structure is not necessarily effective.
The second and third models extend the simple model with additional spatial metrics. First
we include the count of the number of each of the four competitors within a 10 kilometer (6
miles) radius, approximately the average driving distance. Then, we augment the original spatial
model with the apex angle, or the angle formed between the customer, focal store, and a given
competitor with the customer at the apex. The results show that also knowing the number of
nearby competitors is much more valuable than simply knowing distance between the customer and
each store. In addition, knowing the angle between customer and competitors improves substantially
over simply knowing distance. In terms of comparing these two data types, they perform roughly
similarly as one another.
Next, to provide another comparison, we estimate three spatial models in the spirit of classic
gravity models. These models date back to Reilly (1931) who coined the “law of retail gravitation”
and are extended to a more flexible model by Huff (1964). These gravity models are designed to
predict store choice while we have richer data on spending, but only at the focal store. We attempt
to preserve the theoretical insight of these models but adjust the specification to instead predict the







, where d represents the distance
between the customer and each store type k (the focal store and the four competitors) and w are
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the weights or “attractiveness” of each store.
We consider several Huff-style model specifications. In the first, we set the store attractiveness
or mass to be the square footage of each competitor type and in the second specification we treat
each store attractiveness as a parameter to estimate. In both of these cases, the decay parameter α
is estimated using maximum likelihood. In our third specification we allow αk to differ over store
type. For segmentation, we take the models predictions and group the customers based on the
percentile of positive spend in the training data.26
We find that the gravity models perform quite well overall at identifying profitable customer
groups. They outperform the mass marketing approach and the rule of thumb strategies. They also
do better out-of-sample than the models using simple sales data or distance data alone, suggesting
that those models are prone to overfitting in a way the more parsimonious gravity models are not.
However, performance is similar to the augmented simple spatial models. In the next subsection we
show that our preferred specification performs about three times as as well as the Huff-style gravity
models, however.
Contribution to Model Fit
Table A.2 presents the model fit using our two dependent variables of interest, where each row
represents a single subset of the available variables. The first column displays the pseudo-R2 from
a logistic regression and the second column the standard R2 from a linear regression. The variables
are separated into one of five labels: our proposed spatial metrics, RFM (trip frequency and sales
information), basket composition (number of items per basket, distinct items, distinct categories,
etc.), the marketing indicator satisfying the exclusion restriction, and finally the selection correction
polynomials from the first stage.
The spatial metrics explain considerably more than any of the alternative variable types. The
sum of the R2 values across the partial models is similar to the fit from the aggregate model
in the final row. This suggests that the variable types tend to be relatively orthogonal to each
other. In other words, the spatial information appears to be adding a non-trivial amount of unique
information to the model that would otherwise be absorbed into the residuals.
A natural rebuttal to this table is that the results are driven simply by the sheer number of
26We attempted numerous variations on the Huff model given that it is not a direct translation of the original
method, and kept only those that performed best at accurately estimating change in spending. More details are
available upon request.
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spatial variables relative to the other variable types. This is only partially true: recall that all of
the spatial metrics are derived solely from the latitude and longitude of the focal store, competition,
and the customer. From a managerial perspective it is very easy to recreate the diverse set of spatial
metrics once these few location points are obtained. In this sense, it is more the variety among
the spatial variables we designed, rather than simply the number of variables, that contributes a
substantial amount of information to each model.
Variable Type Pr(Join) ∆ Sales|Join
Spatial 3.4% 14.9%
RFM 0.6% 9.8%
Basket composition <0.1% 3.7%
Marketing 0.1% n.a.
Selection correction p̂ n.a. 3.3%
All variable types 4.1% 29.8%
Table A.2: Pseudo-R2 and R2 by variable type
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